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Abstract 
This Working Paper analyses three trends in interparliamentary cooperation in the European Union 
(EU). All of them pertain to the notable increase in the number of interparliamentary meetings in 
recent years. First, there is a growing tendency towards functional specialization, with the creation of 
three new permanent interparliamentary bodies for specific policy fields – foreign and security policy, 
economic governance, and (prospectively) Justice and Home Affairs. Second, the EU Speakers 
Conference has lately consolidated its constitutive role as the body that oversees the creation of other 
forms of interparliamentary cooperation within the EU and also supervises their ongoing functioning. 
Third, more and more interparliamentary meetings are held within the framework of the 
‘Parliamentary Dimension’ of the rotating Council Presidency; this gives a role to the ‘Presidency 
Parliament’ which acts as agenda-setter, host and chair of a series of interparliamentary meetings 
during the six-month period. The argument of this Working Paper is that the collective effect of these 
three trends has been to rationalize interparliamentary meetings within the EU, making them 
significantly more ‘orderly’. 
Keywords 
European Union; EU Speakers Conference; Functional Specialization; Interparliamentary 
Cooperation; Parliamentary Dimension. 
 
  1 
I. Introduction: Order or Disorder? 
There has been significant upheaval in the world of interparliamentary cooperation in the years since 
the Treaty of Lisbon passed into law. Most significantly, two major new Interparliamentary 
Conferences (IPCs) have been launched: in 2012, the ‘Interparliamentary Conference on the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU’ (the CFSP-
CSDP Conference) was established;
1
 and in 2013, the ‘Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, 
Economic Coordination and Governance in the European Union’ (the SECG Conference) was 
initiated.
2
 However, in both cases the act of creation was marred by conflict, in particular between the 
European Parliament (EP) and national parliaments, over how these new IPCs should be established, 
organized, and run – leading them to be described with words such as ‘contested’3 and even 
‘battlefield’.4 More generally, the number of interparliamentary meetings – both small and large, 
formal and informal – has continued to increase without, according to one observer, any overall sense 
of order or control.
5
 Adding to the potential confusion, in addition to face-to-face meetings, more and 
more interparliamentary cooperation also takes place virtually, i.e. by correspondence, as is largely the 
case with the early warning mechanism for subsidiarity control.
6
 It therefore seems reasonable to 
describe interparliamentary cooperation in the EU as being in a state of “disorder”.7  
It will be argued here, on the contrary, that there is an emerging order of interparliamentary 
conferences in the EU after the Lisbon Treaty. This order stems from three major trends representing 
changing norms and practices in the field of interparliamentary cooperation. These three trends pertain 
not to ‘virtual’ cooperation but specifically to the structure and organization of face-to-face 
interparliamentary meetings. The first trend concerns what kind of interparliamentary conferences are 
being created: overwhelmingly, the new meetings being created are functionally specialized, focused 
on particular policy areas. The second trend concerns how these new bodies should be constituted and 
how their ongoing development should be monitored: increasingly, it is the EU Speakers Conference 
that has taken on the task not only of creating these new bodies, but also reviewing their continuing 
functioning after their creation.
8
 The third trend concerns how the logistical arrangements for 
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interparliamentary conferences are organized, in terms of their timing and location and which 
parliament acts as chair and sets the agenda. This task falls increasingly upon the rotating Presidency 
Parliament, which now has the responsibility for organizing the six-monthly series of events that has 
become known as the ‘Parliamentary Dimension’ of the Council Presidency. The argument here is that 
the collective effect of these three trends is to rationalize interparliamentary meetings within the EU, 
making them significantly more ‘orderly’.  
There are a few caveats to be inserted at this point. To claim that there is an emerging ‘order’ of 
interparliamentary cooperation is not to deny that there is conflict among its participants; rather, it 
helps to put such conflict into a broader context. Even years after the two new IPCs have been in 
operation, participating parliaments continue to disagree over their exact nature and purpose, a dispute 
sometimes framed as a debate over whether they ought to be ‘discussion forums’ or ‘oversight 
bodies’.9 Despite this persistent disagreement, these IPCs still serve as examples of the three trends to 
be highlighted in this chapter. On the other hand, they also demonstrate, in different ways, that there 
are limits to these trends. For example, while policy-specific IPCs have been established in the fields 
of foreign and security policy and economic governance, an interparliamentary mechanism foreseen in 
the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) has not yet been established. Similarly, while the EU 
Speakers Conference now has a commonly accepted role in establishing and supervising other IPCs, 
there is still debate within that body over what is the exact extent – and what are the concomitant 
limits – of its role. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to show that these trends are emerging, but also 
to recognize that they have not fully taken hold. As a final caveat, the goal of the present analysis to 
draw attention to these trends as significant empirical developments in the world of interparliamentary 
cooperation, not necessarily to approve or disapprove of them from a normative point of view. 
The chapter aims to explain these three post-Lisbon trends in interparliamentary cooperation. First 
(Section II), the chapter describes the development of functionally specific interparliamentary 
cooperation. The two new functionally specific IPCs, the CFSP-CDSP Conference and the SECG 
Conference, are described briefly, as their development is already well-documented. Then, there is a 
more detailed discussion of the lesser-known case of interparliamentary cooperation in JHA. In this 
field, it is expected that a new interparliamentary oversight mechanism will be created in the near 
future – specifically for the political monitoring of Europol – but this has yet to happen. It is posited 
that these three policy fields – foreign and defense policy, economic governance, and JHA – share 
certain common attributes that set them apart from most other EU policies: (a) they were all partly 
developed outside the Community method, so that the oversight powers of the EP may be limited; (b) 
they involve EU action that is largely executive rather than legislative; and (c) they touch on sensitive 
issues of national sovereignty and identity, regarding which important powers rest with the member 
states. These commonalities suggest a rationale for establishing specialized interparliamentary bodies 
in these specific policy areas, for national parliaments and the EP together to exercise joint oversight 
over the executive actions of the EU.  
The next section (Section III) chronicles the emerging role of the EU Speakers Conference as the 
interparliamentary body with the authority to establish and supervise the development of other forms 
of interparliamentary cooperation. Both the CFSP-CSDP Conference and the SECG Conference 
recognized this authority insofar as both of them deferred entirely to the guidelines set down by the 
EU Speakers Conference in establishing and/or revising their own Rules of Procedure. Yet when the 
EU Speakers Conference reviewed the functioning of these two IPCs at its 2015 meeting in Rome, it 
also demonstrated self-restraint in exercising its supervisory authority, acknowledging that the IPCs 
are autonomous bodies and it could not simply impose its will on them. The inquiry continues (Section 
IV) with an examination of the third trend in order to demonstrate that the logistical demands of the 
interparliamentary calendar have heightened the role of the Presidency Parliament – the parliament of 
the member state that holds the rotating Council Presidency and acts as the organizer and agenda-
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setter for interparliamentary meetings. Even as the Council Presidency has declined in importance, the 
role of the Presidency Parliament has gained greater prominence. The ‘Parliamentary Dimension of 
the Council Presidency’ is a new term coined to refer to the series of events, including not only the 
major IPCs but also smaller chairpersons’ meetings, organized by the Presidency Parliament in a way 
that to some extent reflects its policy priorities. Finally, the chapter concludes (Section V) that on the 
whole these three trends, which to varying degrees developed as a consequence of the Treaty of 
Lisbon and the financial crisis, indicate the resilience of national parliaments. 
II. Interparliamentary Cooperation in Functionally Specific Fields 
Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, there were just two long-standing interparliamentary conferences in the 
EU, both of which had a “general” rather than functionally specific competence. These were COSAC 
(the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European 
Union)
10
 and the EU Speakers Conference. The Convention on the Future of Europe of 2002-2003 had 
discussed, and ultimately rejected, the idea of creating a parliamentary ‘third chamber’ for the EU with 
a general policy competence. Instead, the Convention devised the so-called early warning mechanism 
as a device that would give national parliaments a direct role in EU politics – as ‘subsidiarity 
watchdogs’ – without actually creating any new EU-level institutions.11 This was subsequently 
incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon. As a consequence, this Treaty did not establish any new 
interparliamentary bodies, either of a general or a functionally specific character. It did, however, 
mention two specific policy fields as potential areas for enhanced interparliamentary cooperation – 
CFSP and JHA. Moreover, a later treaty, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG or Fiscal Compact), introduced the idea of creating an 
interparliamentary conference to oversee the policy field of economic governance. Thus, in these three 
specific policy areas, EU treaties provided at least a minimal treaty basis for the specialized policy-
specific interparliamentary cooperation that would be developed in the post-Lisbon EU. The following 
sub-sections examine these IPCs in turn. 
The CFSP-CSDP Conference 
The first policy-specific interparliamentary body was established in the field of CFSP-CSDP. This 
policy area is mentioned in Article 10 of Protocol no. 1 on the Role of National Parliaments in the 
European Union, annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, which stated that COSAC may ‘organise 
interparliamentary conferences on specific topics, in particular to debate matters of common foreign 
and security policy, including common security and defence policy’.12 This can be read as giving 
COSAC a mandate to organize an IPC on CFSP-CSDP. However, in the event it was not COSAC but 
the EU Speakers Conference that set the guidelines for the CFSP-CSDP Conference, doing so at its 
meetings in Brussels (April 2011) and in Warsaw (April 2012).
13
 The new conference was in part a 
replacement for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU), which was 
abolished in 2011. It also replaced and consolidated two smaller twice-yearly meetings, the 
Conference of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairpersons (COFACC) and the Conference of Defence 
Affairs Committee Chairpersons (CODACC). The CFSP-CSDP Conference itself met for the first 
time in Cyprus in September 2012, at which time it adopted its own Rules of Procedure and a set of 
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Conclusions. Since then, it has met twice a year, each time in the member state holding the Council 
Presidency. It is customary for each meeting of the CFSP-CSDP Conference to be addressed by the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as well as the Foreign 
Minister and the Defence Minister from the member state holding the Council Presidency.
14
  
The SECG Conference 
The impetus for the second policy-specific interparliamentary body came not from the Treaty of 
Lisbon but from the TSCG. In early 2012, to address the ongoing financial crisis, 25 EU member 
states signed the TSCG outside the framework of the EU Treaties. Article 13 thereof mandated the 
creation of an interparliamentary conference in the field of EU economic governance calling upon the 
EP and national parliaments to determine the organisation and promotion of a conference of 
representatives of their relevant committees in order ‘to discuss budgetary policies and other issues 
covered by this Treaty’. 
Much as it had done with the CFSP-CSDP Conference, the EU Speakers Conference established 
the guidelines for the new IPC at its meeting in Nicosia in April 2013. According to these guidelines, 
this IPC consolidated and replaced previous meetings of the chairs of the budget and finance 
committees of the EP and national parliaments. Furthermore, whereas the meeting in the second half 
of the year would be hosted and chaired by the Presidency Parliament, as is usual for IPCs, the 
meeting in the first half of the year should take place on the EP premises in Brussels and be co-chaired 
by the Presidency Parliament and the EP.
15
 
The first meeting of the new IPC, which met in Vilnius in October 2013 under the title of the 
‘Interparliamentary Conference on Economic and Financial Governance’, was rancorous. In fact, the 
chief disagreement was not over economic policy – e.g. right vs. left, pro- vs. anti-austerity, ordo-
liberalism vs. Keynesianism – but rather over the conference’s institutional arrangements. The 
parliament chairing the meeting, the Lithuanian Seimas, had proposed an ambitious agenda including 
the adoption of Rules of Procedure and Conclusions. This was supported by a number of parliaments, 
including the French, but opposed by the EP as well as some other parliaments, including the German. 
This dispute reflected a deeper disagreement about whether it should be a strong conference with a 
broad scope or a weak conference with a narrow scope.
16
 Subsequent meetings alternated between a 
conference at the EP in Brussels within the context of the ‘European Parliamentary Week’ in January 
or February, and a conference in the Presidency Parliament in the autumn. After much delay, and after 
having been issued further guidelines by the EU Speakers Conference in May 2015 (see Section III 
below), the conference agreed its own Rules of Procedure at its fifth meeting in Luxembourg in 
November 2015. At that point, the conference, which had met under many different names, finally 
called itself the ‘Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Cooperation and Governance’ 
– the SECG Conference. 
The Prospective JHA Conference on Europol 
Among these three policy areas, it is arguably in the field of JHA where the Treaty basis is strongest 
for the specialized involvement of national parliaments. The Treaty of Lisbon states that national 
parliaments have both a general role overseeing the whole policy field, and a specific oversight role in 
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relation to two agencies – Europol and Eurojust. One of the ways national parliaments contribute to 
the ‘good functioning of the Union’ is in part by ‘taking part, within the framework of the area of 
freedom, security and justice, in the evaluation mechanisms for the implementation of the Union 
policies in that area’, and, more specifically, ‘through being involved in the political monitoring of 
Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust’s activities’.17 More generally, the EU Treaty singles out JHA 
as a policy field subject to enhanced scrutiny under the early warning mechanism, requiring that 
national parliaments ‘ensure’ that new proposals in this area are compliant with subsidiarity,18 and the 
voting threshold for a ‘yellow card’ is lowered from one-third to one quarter. Despite these Treaty 
provisions, no interparliamentary mechanism has yet been created in the field of JHA. It remains 
uncertain not only what form an interparliamentary mechanism should take, but also how it should be 
established – whether to do so through EU legislation or through interparliamentary negotiation. 
The most significant movement in this direction has been in relation to Europol, the EU agency for 
police cooperation. Europol was established in 1999 as an international organization under the EU’s 
‘Third Pillar’, subject to very limited oversight from the EP and only indirect oversight from national 
parliaments, via their government ministers in the Council.
19
 While the EP has long sought greater 
oversight powers vis-à-vis Europol, there have also been various proposals for some form of joint 
scrutiny involving national parliaments. For example, in 2002 the Commission suggested the creation 
of a joint supervisory committee in relation to Europol, to be made up of members of parliament 
(MPs) and members of the EP (MEPs).
20
 Europol became an EU agency following a Council Decision 
of 2009, and the Treaty of Lisbon made it subject to regulation in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure (i.e. co-decision): the EP and the Council ‘shall determine Europol’s structure, 
operation, field of action and tasks’, including ‘the procedures for scrutiny of Europol’s activities by 
the European Parliament, together with national Parliaments’.21  
In March 2013, the Commission proposed a Regulation that would finally bring Europol into line 
with the Treaty of Lisbon. The proposal stated that Europol’s activities would be subject to 
‘parliamentary scrutiny by the European parliament, together with national parliaments’, but left it 
open as to what form this should take.
22
 The EP, however, responded with very specific proposals of 
its own in February 2014. In its amendments to the draft Regulation, the EP proposed the creation of a 
specialized body to be called the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG), made up of the all the 
MEPs in the EP’s Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee in addition to two members of the 
relevant committee from each national parliament.
23
 The JPSG would exercise something close to a 
traditional parliamentary oversight function with respect to Europol, in that executive officials would 
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appear before it at its request, and key documents related to the agency’s activities and performance 
would be presented and debated. It would review the appointment (and re-appointment) of the 
Executive Director of Europol, and hold hearings with the Chairperson of the Europol Management 
Board, Commission representatives, the European Data Protection Supervisor, and other relevant 
officials. If created, the JPSG would be the first institution of its kind, in that it would involve national 
parliamentarians in the direct and structured oversight over an EU agency.  
This issue was discussed at the EU Speakers Conference in Vilnius in April 2014. The Italian 
Parliament, traditionally an ally of the EP, proposed that the EU Speakers Conference should endorse 
the ‘prompt adoption’ of the Europol Regulation, including its provisions with respect to 
parliamentary scrutiny. However, some participants resisted this proposal on procedural grounds, 
saying that any new mechanism should be established by parliaments themselves, rather than through 
the EU legislative process in which national parliaments are not directly involved. A very different 
proposal was put forward by Eva Kopacz, Speaker of the Polish Sejm (who later became Polish Prime 
Minister), with the support of the Polish Senate, the Irish Senate and the Hungarian Parliament. The 
speakers of these chambers proposed the creation of a full-blown interparliamentary conference for the 
whole policy field of JHA, including scrutiny of the activities of Europol and Eurojust. The new IPC 
would be modelled on the formula of the CFSP-CSDP and SECG Conferences, in that it would 
replace existing meetings of chairpersons, meet twice a year and be co-hosted and co-presided over by 
the EP and the Presidency Parliament. This new body, it was suggested, could also exercise oversight 
over the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, if and when the latter comes into being.24 However, the 
idea of a new interparliamentary conference was rejected as unnecessary by the EP representative, 
Vice-President Miguel Angel Martinez Martinez. He remarked acerbically that one could envisage 
interparliamentary conferences for every policy area – sport, agriculture, transport – much like the 
multiple configurations in the Council: by that logic, there could be 15 interparliamentary 
conferences.
25
 He preferred instead the EP’s approach of holding interparliamentary committee 
meetings on an ad hoc basis. He reminded his colleagues that this field is now largely covered by co-
decision, and that national parliaments should focus their scrutiny on their own governments’ positions 
in the Council. In the face of this disagreement, no decision was taken.  
In late November 2015, the EP and the Council reached an agreement on the Europol Regulation; it 
was adopted in May 2016 and was set to enter into force on 1 May 2017. The Regulation endorsed the 
establishment of a JPSG, but it did not specify how it should be constituted. Instead, it merely stated 
that the JPSG, its organisation and rules of procedure, shall be established together by the EP and 
national parliaments in accordance with Article 9 of Protocol no. 1 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty. This 
Article states that the EP and national parliaments ‘shall together determine the organisation and 
promotion of effective and regular interparliamentary cooperation within the Union’. This means in 
practice that it will be the task of the EU Speakers Conference to make the decision regarding the 
practical arrangements for the JPSG. At its May 2016 meeting in Luxembourg, the EU Speakers 
Conference recognized that while the Europol Regulation defined the “objectives and missions” of the 
JPSG, the “modalities of parliamentary scrutiny” must be defined by the parliaments themselves, 
“while stressing that the European Parliament and national Parliaments are on equal footing.” To that 
end, it set up a Working Group to consider possible scrutiny mechanisms and, after consulting other 
parliaments, to present a draft proposal in autumn 2016; it was hoped, perhaps optimistically, that after 
                                                     
24
 The second ‘yellow card’ under the early warning mechanism was issued in response to the Commission’s proposal to 
create the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. D Fromage, ‘The Second Yellow Card on the EPPO Proposal: An 
Encouraging Development for Member State Parliaments?’ (2015), Yearbook of European Law (advanced access). 
25
 “On peut envisager une espèce de commencer à travailler comme travaille le Conseil. Avec les conférences, les conseils 
des ministres du sport, des ministers de l’agriculture, des ministres de transport. Nous pourrions envisager de travailler 
sur la base d’une quinzaine de conférences. Et l’on serait tout le temps en conférence.” Miguel Angel Martinez Martinez, 
8 April 2014. Transcribed by the author from video archived on the Lithuanian Presidency website, available at: 
<http://www.lrs.lt/intl/presidency.show?theme=842&lang=4&p_eventguid=5149749b-73c7-45ec-a613-33517db95b83>. 
The Emerging Order of Interparliamentary Cooperation in the EU 
European University Institute 7 
further discussions a text setting out the organization of the JPSG could be adopted by the EU 
Speakers Conference in early 2017.
26
  
Commonalities between the Policy Fields Covered by Interparliamentary Cooperation 
Is there a common thread that connects these three policy areas? Is there a discernable logic to having 
national parliaments exercise an enhanced oversight role with respect to EU policy in these three 
particular fields, but not to all the others? Is there a rejoinder to Mr. Martinez’s comment that we 
might as well go ahead and have fifteen interparliamentary conferences? In response, we may begin by 
noting that the Council also treats these three specific policy areas differently: this is apparent in the 
division of labour between Coreper I and Coreper II – the two formations of the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives that do the preparatory work for Council meetings. Coreper II is the senior 
body, consisting of the member states’ ambassadors to the EU, whereas Coreper I is made up of their 
deputies. Whereas Coreper I deals with low-salience policy areas such as transport, education, 
employment, and the environment, Coreper II deals with policy areas of the highest political salience. 
In addition to ‘general affairs’, Coreper II prepares the work of three policy-specific Council 
formations: Economic and Financial Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and JHA. This gives some indication 
that these three policy areas share certain commonalities. 
On a cautionary note, it should be acknowledged that all three of these policy fields have uncertain 
boundaries, in that each of them may be defined narrowly or broadly. In all three cases, there has been 
a debate over whether the interparliamentary body overseeing the policy field in question should have 
a narrow or broad field of concern. There was debate within the CFSP-CSDP Conference as to 
whether it should focus solely on CFSP-CSDP matters or also discuss related policy fields, such as 
development cooperation and humanitarian aid.
27
 The field of economic governance is generally less 
well-defined as a policy field than CFSP-CSDP.
28
 Within the SECG Conference, there was a debate 
over whether the discussions should be focused solely on the terms of the Fiscal Compact – i.e. fiscal 
consolidation and structural reform within the member states – or whether it should also deal with 
broader financial concerns, such as the Banking Union.
29
 That the EP was among the strongest 
advocates of a narrow scope of interparliamentary cooperation was demonstrated on two particular 
occasions: (a) when it objected to the original title – the ‘Interparliamentary Conference on Economic 
and Financial Governance’ – and pushed to change the word ‘financial’ to ‘fiscal’ to reflect a narrower 
sphere of concern;
30
 and (b) when, at the 2014 EU Speakers Conference, it rejected the creation of a 
full-blown IPC that would have covered the whole policy field of JHA. Thus, in thinking about what 
these three policy fields have in common, we should bear in mind that how they should be defined is a 
politically contested question, the answer to which may have practical consequences for the 
organization of interparliamentary oversight bodies. This said, these three policy areas, broadly 
defined, share certain commonalities that separate them from other EU policy fields.  
First, EU policy development in these three areas has, to varying degrees, been at least partly 
outside the traditional Community method: decision making has been intergovernmental, with a 
limited role for the supranational institutions of the EU – the Commission, the EP, and the European 
Court of Justice. After the Treaty of Maastricht, two of these policy areas – CFSP-CSDP and JHA – 
were two separate intergovernmental ‘pillars’ of the EU, legally outside the first, Community Pillar. 
This was because they both involved sensitive questions of national sovereignty, concerning 
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respectively the external and internal security of the member states. Even today, after the Treaty of 
Lisbon has dissolved the pillar structure and the EU has become a single legal entity, the field of 
CFSP-CSDP remains largely intergovernmental, over which the supranational EU institutions, 
including the EP, have limited sway.
31
 However, the field of JHA has now largely been brought within 
the realm of the Community method, and here the EP enjoys increased powers, including legislative 
co-decision, which it is anxious to preserve. Compared to the other two, the policy field of EU 
economic and financial governance is relatively new. Of course, the groundwork for the Economic and 
Monetary Union, including many of its attendant rules, date back at least to the Maastricht Treaty. But 
the recent financial crisis gave rise to a new regime of EU economic governance that has also been 
largely developed outside the Community method, relying instead on the intergovernmental ‘Union 
method’. Indeed, some of its legal instruments – including the TSCG, Article 13 of which gave the 
impetus for the SECG Conference – are outside of the framework of the EU treaties. While the 
Commission has in fact seen an increase in its powers of surveillance of national budgets, this process 
has adversely affected the EP, which is largely excluded from exercising oversight in this area.
32
 
Unlike CFSP-CSDP and JHA, EU economic governance does not concern security, but it does touch 
on sensitive issues of national sovereignty. Most notably, it encroaches on the power of member states 
to make independent decisions about public finances, and this encroachment particularly affects 
national parliaments, the institutions that enact national budgets. 
A second commonality is that the EU’s activities in these three policy fields tend to emphasize 
executive action rather than legislation. As a rule, foreign and security policy, whether at the national 
or EU level, is the realm of executive action par excellence. The CFSP-CSDP Conference enables 
members of the foreign affairs and defence committees of the parliaments of the EU to exchange 
information and best practices to enhance their oversight of their respective governments in these 
matters. But the conference itself also to some extent directly oversees these EU policies – including 
the European External Action Service and its head, the High Representative, who customarily attends 
the CFSP-CSDP Conference to make a statement and answer questions from the assembled 
parliamentarians. Similarly, while the field of JHA does involve EU legislation, it is also notable in 
that it involves executive agencies exercising discretionary powers in sensitive fields such as police 
cooperation (Europol) and judicial cooperation (Eurojust). Finally, while much of the EU economic 
governance regime was put in place by EU legislation – most notably the system of budgetary 
surveillance and economic coordination set out in the ‘Six Pack’ and the ‘Two Pack’ – it is largely 
implemented by the Commission. The Commission has considerable discretion in enforcing the rules 
of this regime, although in the background lies the threat of punitive sanctions imposed by the Council 
against a persistent rule-breaker.
33
 
Since these three policy fields involve governance to some extent outside the Community method, 
and as a result fall less under the control of the EP, then an increased role for national parliaments 
could compensate for this deficiency. There is a case to be made that if the policy question touches on 
sensitive issues of national sovereignty, such as external or internal security of the individual member 
states, then this too is a reason for greater involvement of national parliaments. Moreover, if the policy 
in question has an adverse impact on national parliaments – for example their budgetary autonomy – 
then this too could provide a rationale for their involvement in scrutinizing it. The fact that EU activity 
in these policy areas favours executive action over legislation means that national parliaments have no 
power to intervene to object under the early warning mechanism, because this mechanism does not 
encompass executive acts. For all these reasons, there is a case for joint oversight, involving the EP 
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and national parliaments acting together, rather than centralized oversight, concentrated in the EP, in 
these particular policy fields.
34
  
III. The Supervisory Role of the EU Speakers Conference 
A second important trend in the emerging order of interparliamentary cooperation is the ‘quasi-
constitutional’ role of the EU Speakers Conference. This conference has assumed the role of 
supervising the establishment and development of other interparliamentary bodies in the EU. As we 
have already seen (Section II), it was the EU Speakers Conference that established both the CFSP-
CSDP Conference in 2012 and the SECG Conference in 2013; moreover, in 2016 it was commonly 
accepted that it would be the task of the EU Speakers Conference to establish the future JPSG for 
Europol. This foundational role is not altogether new: the impetus for the first meeting of COSAC, in 
1989, came from an initiative put forward at the EU Speakers Conference. What is new, however, is 
that the EU Speakers Conference has also assumed an ongoing supervisory role: not only did it 
establish the two new interparliamentary conferences, but in doing so it pledged to review their 
arrangements at a later date, despite the fact that the new conferences were supposed to be 
autonomous, self-governing entities. Yet on the other hand, there appear to be limits to this 
supervisory role, as became apparent at the meeting of the EU Speakers Conference in Rome in April 
2015. 
It is perhaps surprising that the EU Speakers Conference has assumed the role of ‘gatekeeper’ of 
interparliamentary cooperation in the EU, given that it is not mentioned anywhere in the EU Treaties, 
and that throughout much of its history it was only loosely affiliated with the EU and its predecessor 
institutions, the European Communities. The EU Speakers Conference met for the first time in 1963, 
for the second time in 1973, and then more or less annually from 1975 onwards. Between 1980 and 
1998, the annual meetings alternated between a small conference of the Speakers of the ‘European 
Communities Parliaments’ (national parliaments of the European Communities, plus the EP) and a 
large conference of the Speakers of the ‘European Parliamentary Assemblies’ (national parliaments of 
the Council of Europe, plus the EP and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe). It is 
only since 1999 that the EU Speakers Conference ‘has become an autonomous forum of cooperation 
and has affirmed its general competence of coordination and supervision of the interparliamentary 
cooperation in the EU’.35 While it does not have ‘standing orders’ or ‘rules of procedure’,36 in 2000 
the EU Speakers Conference adopted its own ‘Guidelines’, which were amended in 2010. Moreover, it 
adopted Guidelines of Interparliamentary Cooperation in 2004, which were amended in 2008. These 
two sets of guidelines are generally accepted as the documents that set out the basic rules of 
interparliamentary cooperation and establish the key role of the EU Speakers Conference in organizing 
it. 
However, this leadership role of the EU Speakers Conference was contested, in particular regarding 
the establishment of the CFSP-CSDP Conference. It may be argued that the Treaty of Lisbon gave 
COSAC a mandate to establish the CFSP-CSDP Conference, but this was ‘stolen’ by the EU Speakers 
Conference.
37
 Specifically, a debate arose as to whether the CFSP-CSDP Conference should be 
established by the EU Speakers Conference (based on Article 9 of Protocol no. 1 annexed to the 
Lisbon Treaty) or by COSAC (based on Article 10 of the same Protocol).
38
 Whereas some national 
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parliaments favoured COSAC, the EU Speakers Conference was favoured in particular by the EP. In 
the end, after much delay, the EP position won the day, and this cemented the role of the EU Speakers 
Conference as the body that governs interparliamentary cooperation. The establishment of the CFSP-
CSDP Conference by the EU Speakers Conference proved a powerful precedent, so that when the time 
came to establish the SECG Conference, few questioned the legitimacy of the EU Speakers 
Conference playing the same foundational role again. 
Despite the general acceptance of the EU Speakers Conference in establishing new forms of 
interparliamentary cooperation, disagreement persists – not least within the conference itself – over the 
extent and limits of its supervisory role. Specifically, are the internal Rules of Procedure of the new 
interparliamentary conferences dependent on the approval of the EU Speakers Conference, and if so 
what form should such approval take? This question arose because when the EU Speakers Conference 
established the other conferences it recommended ‘conducting a review’ of their ‘arrangements’ at a 
later date. With regard to the CFSP-CSDP Conference, the 2012 Presidency Conclusions requested 
such a review ‘after two years from its first meeting’.39 A similar recommendation was issued with 
regard to the Article 13 Conference. In both these cases, the role of the EU Speakers Conference was 
ambiguous. On the one hand, it laid the foundation for a new, and presumably autonomous, IPC; on 
the other hand, it asserted its own supervisory role regarding the review of the ongoing arrangements 
for the new body. 
Even after it was generally acknowledged that it is the job of the EU Speakers Conference to 
‘establish’ a new IPC, it remained uncertain whether it should make all important decisions regarding 
the new body or simply set the parameters for it. Nowhere was this ambiguity in greater evidence than 
in relation to the Rules of Procedure for each of the new IPCs. In substantive terms, must the Rules for 
the new IPC remain within the guidelines set by the EU Speakers Conference, or could the new body, 
by an autonomous act, go beyond them? In procedural terms, does the new body autonomously 
establish its own Rules of Procedure, or is it up to the EU Speakers Conference to ‘confirm’ or ‘ratify’ 
them? Moreover, if an IPC is unable to agree on its Rules of Procedure – as was the case initially with 
the SECG Conference – can and should the EU Speakers Conference pre-emptively ‘adopt’ them on 
its behalf? 
These questions were addressed in concrete, practical terms at the EU Speakers Conference in 
Rome in April 2015, which was tasked with reviewing the arrangements for the CFSP-CSDP and 
SECG Conferences, which were in very different states. Whereas the CFSP-CSDP Conference had a 
relatively smooth and consensual internal review process, the SECG Conference was still internally 
divided over basic questions concerning its structure and functioning. Even so, both cases showed how 
the EU Speakers Conference – or at least a number of its members – was reluctant to adopt Rules of 
Procedure on behalf of another IPC. Many of the speakers and/or representatives of national 
parliaments were ambivalent about the EU Speakers Conference imposing its will upon the other 
IPCs, which they regarded as autonomous. Despite this ambivalence, the EU Speakers Conference 
made all the important substantive decisions regarding the Rules of Procedure for the SECG 
Conference, even if it did not formally ‘adopt’ them. Furthermore, rather than insisting on their ‘self-
determination’, the two new IPCs were entirely deferential to the decisions of the EU Speakers 
Conference. Both the CFSP-CSDP Conference, when conducting an internal review of its workings 
between 2013 and early 2015, and the SECG Conference, when finalizing its Rules of Procedure in 
November 2015, acted entirely in conformity with the parameters set by the EU Speakers Conference. 
This was due in no small part to the EP’s consistent promotion of the supervisory role of the EU 
Speakers Conference both within this Conference and within the policy-specific IPCs. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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Review of the CFSP-CSDP Conference 
The CFSP-CSDP Conference adopted its own Rules of Procedure at its first meeting in Cyprus in 
September 2012. This document recognized an ongoing supervisory role for the EU Speakers 
Conference in two specific ways: (a) it stipulated that any amendments to the Rules of Procedure must 
be decided by consensus and ‘must be in accordance with the framework set by the Conference of 
Speakers of the EU Parliaments’ (Article 8.2); and (b) it foresaw that an Ad Hoc Review Committee 
reviewing the workings of the Conference would ‘make recommendations thereon to be deliberated 
upon by the Conference of EU Speakers’ (Article 9). 
One year later, at the meeting in Vilnius in September 2013, the Ad Hoc Review Committee was 
convened and a Working Group – made up of representatives of the ‘presidency trio’ of Ireland, 
Lithuania, and Greece, with the addition of Cyprus, Italy and the EP – compiled and categorized the 
proposed amendments, and made recommendations to the Ad Hoc Committee, which reported them to 
the Athens Conference in April 2014. The Ad Hoc Committee recommended a few minor changes to 
the Rules of Procedure, and the adoption of another document, called ‘Best Practices’, to serve as 
supplemental guidelines as to how the conference should be conducted. These changes were submitted 
for the approval of the EU Speakers Conference in Rome in April 2015. 
It is notable that the internal process by which the CFSP-CSDP Conference reviewed its own 
procedures deferred entirely to the EU Speakers Conference. This is no exaggeration: the Ad Hoc 
Review Committee categorically denied consideration to any proposed amendment to the Rules of 
Procedure that was ‘in contradiction with the Warsaw Conclusions’. This ruled out, for example, 
consideration of a proposal to change the voting rules to those in use at COSAC: both the German 
Bundestag and the Latvian Saiema separately proposed that the conference should not operate solely 
on a consensus basis, but rather should be able to adopt Conclusions by a qualified majority of 3/4 of 
votes cast in circumstances where consensus is unobtainable. This meant, in effect, that the review 
process did not permit any major revision of the Rules of Procedure, but was basically a modest 
housekeeping exercise.  
Yet despite the deference shown to it, the EU Speakers Conference in Rome proved cautious in the 
manner in which it exerted its authority vis-à-vis the CFSP-CSDP Conference. The Italian Parliament 
hosting the meeting had originally proposed that the EU Speakers Conference should ‘ratify’ the result 
of the review, but this met with objections from a number of representatives, including from the UK, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands. The representative from the UK remarked: ‘We are of the opinion that it 
is not the business of this conference to ratify or adopt Rules of Procedure for any other conference’. 
Similarly, the Swedish representative said: ‘We should only limit ourselves to discussions, and not 
ratifications, in this setting’. The Speaker from the Netherlands rejected the use of ‘ratify’ or similar 
terms, such as ‘adopt’ or ‘confirm’, because they tend to usurp the authority of the conferences to 
adopt their own rules: ‘The specific conferences draft their own Rules of Procedure and they are the 
masters of those Rules of Procedure’.40 Many proposed that the EU Speakers Conference should 
merely ‘take note of’, rather than ‘ratify’ the CFSP-CSDP Conference’s Best Practices and amended 
Rules of Procedure. By contrast, EP President Martin Schulz insisted that it was the responsibility of 
the EU Speakers Conference to ‘adopt’ the documents. He even went as far as to quote directly to 
them the words of the 2008 Guidelines for Interparliamentary Cooperation, which said that the EU 
Speakers Conference ‘shall oversee the coordination of interparliamentary EU activities’. Schulz took 
from this that the authority of the other conferences is entirely dependent on the EU Speakers 
Conference: 
Our role is to coordinate what all the sectorial assemblies do…What they have decided has to [be] 
coordinated here…They adopt Rules of Procedures for their sectorial body, but the frame in which 
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they act is our conference…We adopt it… If we would not adopt it, it is not adopted, because they 
have no right to provide themselves with their own rules.
41
 
While some parliamentarians thought that this was merely a semantic debate: ‘We are splitting hairs 
here’, said the Irish Speaker; others maintained that it was significant: ‘I’ve got a legal background, 
and as a lawyer you know that the wording is important’, said the Speaker from the Netherlands. The 
chair of the meeting, the Speaker of the Italian Senate, seemed puzzled by the controversy, and 
continually tried to bring the discussion back to what he saw as the salient point, that the CFSP-CSDP 
Conference had itself reached a consensus (unlike the SECG Conference), which only needed to be 
affirmed by the EU Speakers Conference. However, the debate over what word to use to describe that 
act of affirmation reflected differing views of the nature of the EU Speakers Conference’s supervisory 
role and its implied relationship to the other conferences. In the end, the Presidency Conclusions 
referred to the ‘Discussion and approval of the revision of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference 
for the CFSP-CSDP’, noting also that the Speakers ‘welcome’ the conclusion of the review. 
Review of the SECG Conference 
The 2015 EU Speakers Conference in Rome also reviewed the functioning of the SECG Conference, 
which was in a state of uncertainty. Unlike the CFSP-CSDP Conference, the SECG Conference had 
not yet agreed upon its Rules of Procedure, despite having met four times between late 2013 and early 
2015. The Italian Parliament chairing the meeting proposed that the EU Speakers Conference should 
impose a set of Rules of Procedure and this was supported inter alia by the representatives of the EP 
and the French and German parliaments. However, as was the case for the review of the CFSP-CSDP 
Conference, a number of representatives from national parliaments were reluctant to adopt the rules 
for another, ostensibly autonomous, conference. So, the EU Speakers Conference instead adopted a 
further set of ‘principles’ for the SECG Conference that effectively settled most of the outstanding 
questions regarding its organization. These principles were then incorporated into a new draft of the 
Rules of Procedure, which was finally adopted by the SECG Conference itself in Luxembourg in 
November 2015. This outcome was almost derailed by a last-minute dispute over whether the Rules of 
Procedure should recognize a continuing supervisory role for the EU Speakers Conference, as outlined 
below. 
When the EU Speakers Conference in Rome considered whether to impose Rules of Procedure on 
the SECG Conference, the rationale for this move was that the latter had ‘failed’ to debate and adopt 
them of its own accord. To set the record straight, it should be stated clearly that the SECG 
Conference had never had a chance to properly debate and subsequently adopt its own Rules of 
Procedure, because at all four meetings this item was either removed from the agenda at the last 
minute or kept off the agenda altogether. This was, in particular, a consequence of the actions of 
representatives of the EP and the Italian Parliament. 
For the first meeting (Vilnius, October 2013) the host parliament, the Lithuanian Seimas, had 
produced a draft ‘Rules of Procedure’ and included on the agenda a session for the debate and 
adoption of this document; but after particularly vehement objections from the EP, this item was 
removed and replaced with a more general discussion of the purpose and vision of the conference. 
Many of the national parliamentarians in attendance, who had expected to swiftly debate and adopt the 
Rules of Procedure, criticized this last-minute change to the agenda. The second conference (Brussels, 
January 2014) was hosted and co-chaired (along with the Greek Vouli) by the EP, which saw to it that 
the item was left off the agenda entirely.  
The original agenda for the third conference (Rome, September 2014) had included a session for 
the debate and possible adoption of the Rules of Procedure, and the ground was prepared for this 
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debate given that many parliaments had submitted opinions on the Rules of Procedure and proposed 
amendments to the original draft produced by the Seimas. However, at the start of the third 
conference, the Speaker of the Italian Camera dei Deputati, Laura Boldrini, abruptly announced that 
the conference would not adopt the Rules of Procedure; rather, the decision would be left to the next 
EU Speakers Conference, which was to be held the following April in Rome, hosted by the Italian 
Parliament and co-chaired by herself. What this meant was that the third conference held its scheduled 
‘debate’ on the Rules of Procedure but it was largely moot, as the parliament chairing the meeting had 
already ruled out the possibility that the Rules of Procedure would be adopted. Many of the attendees 
– including representatives from the French, German, Lithuanian, and Polish parliaments – objected to 
this move, with some arguing that consensus was achievable, and therefore the conference could and 
should go ahead and adopt its own Rules of Procedure rather than leaving the matter to the EU 
Speakers Conference. However, these objections went unheeded. After this, the Italian Parliament 
proceeded to collect and compile the proposed amendments to the Rules of Procedure in anticipation 
of their final adoption in Rome in April 2015.  
No discussion of the Rules of Procedure took place at the fourth conference (Brussels, February 
2015) because the Italian Parliament’s review was still ongoing, and also because the EP, again the 
host and co-chair of the meeting, wanted to leave it off the agenda anyway. Thus, of the first four 
meetings of the Article 13 Conference, two (Vilnius and Rome) were prevented from holding a 
decisive debate on the Rules of Procedure, and two (both at the EP in Brussels) did not discuss it at all. 
Notwithstanding the absence of debate on the Rules of Procedure within the SECG Conference 
itself, it was proposed by the representatives of the Italian Parliament, with the full support of those of 
the EP, that the EU Speakers Conference in Rome should ‘adopt’ the Rules of Procedure in its stead. 
However, this proposal faced the same backlash as that concerning the CFSP-CSDP Conference, that 
it was inappropriate for the EU Speakers Conference to be making such a decision on behalf of 
another IPC. Yet, unlike the CFSP-CSDP Conference, the SECG Conference had not reached an 
internal agreement regarding its ongoing arrangements that would make up the substantive content of 
the Rules of Procedure. Consequently, the EU Speakers Conference discussed and agreed a set of 
‘principles’ which ‘shall be transposed in detailed Rules of procedure’ by the SECG Conference itself. 
These were in fact detailed guidelines which left very little discretion to the SECG Conference in 
deciding on its own Rules of Procedure. The EU Speakers Conference made specific decisions 
regarding a number of outstanding issues: the conference’s name (hitherto the ‘Interparliamentary 
Conference on Economic and Financial Governance of the EU’), its general scope, timing, language 
regime, EU officials who should be invited to attend, the establishment of a presidential troika, and the 
manner in which it should adopt conclusions.
42
 Hence, the EU Speakers Conference essentially 
dictated the terms of the Rules of Procedure for the SECG Conference, even though it did not formally 
‘adopt’ them. The SECG Conference subsequently transposed the EU Speakers Conference’s set of 
principles into its Rules of Procedure with strict fidelity, deferring, just as the CFSP-CSDP Conference 
did, entirely to the EU Speakers Conference in establishing its own rules. 
There was, however, a final hitch, leading to a last-minute dispute at the SECG Conference in 
Luxembourg, which reveals how the EP went to great lengths to maintain the EU Speakers Conference 
in a superior position in relation to other IPCs. The Luxembourg Parliament drafted Rules of 
Procedure and circulated the document to the other parliaments prior to the meeting. However, when 
the heads of delegation (mostly the chairs of finance committees of the EP and national parliaments) 
met for the final in camera session to adopt the document, two further changes had been made to it. 
One change was merely technical (clarifying the meaning of the term ‘Presidency Parliament’), but the 
other involved a substantive change regarding how the Rules of Procedure would be amended. 
Whereas the original had only said: ‘Any amendments shall be subject to a decision by consensus by 
the Interparliamentary Conference on SECG’; the new version had added: ‘and must be in accordance 
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with the framework set by the Conference of Speakers of the EU Parliaments’. This added text is 
identical to language in the CFSP-CSDP Conference’s Rules of Procedure. In both cases, this implies 
that even after the new IPC has established its Rules of Procedure it is not really a self-governing 
entity: while it may amend the rules in future, any change must still conform to the framework 
established by the EU Speakers Conference. 
Many representatives from national parliaments strongly objected to these eleventh-hour textual 
changes, and wondered where they had come from. It emerged that they had been inserted at the 
request of the EP delegation.
43
 In the debate, the heads of delegation from national parliaments did not 
object on substantive grounds to the fact that the Rules of Procedure must conform to the framework 
established by the EU Speakers Conference; rather, they raised the procedural objection that they 
cannot agree to a document with last-minute changes, as they did not have sufficient time and 
opportunity to consult with their respective parliaments. For the EP, on the other hand, the substantive 
point was non-negotiable. The head of the EP delegation, Roberto Gualtieri, indicated that he would 
veto any Rules of Procedure that did not contain this language, and he doggedly stuck to this position 
even when, at one point in the debate, he seemed utterly isolated. The other heads of delegation argued 
that the Luxembourg conference should simply adopt the Rules of Procedure document as originally 
circulated and adopt the amendments at the next conference. But to the growing exasperation of the 
national parliamentarians present, Gualtieri refused this suggestion too, saying that he could not agree 
without consulting EP President Schulz. It was then agreed to reconvene for one more unplanned 
session after breaking for lunch. During the break, Gualtieri consulted with colleagues in Brussels 
(though not with Schulz, who was travelling) and came back with a compromise: he would drop his 
insistence on the change regarding the definition of the ‘Presidency Parliament’, but he would not 
relent on the main point – that the Rules of Procedure must respect the framework established by the 
EU Speakers Conference. This small gesture broke the impasse and, with some reluctance, the other 
heads of delegation accepted the document under these conditions. 
This episode is noteworthy because it had the effect of consolidating the position of the EU 
Speakers Conference as the pre-eminent interparliamentary body in the EU, with a role as the 
organizer and supervisor of other forms of interparliamentary cooperation. It also shows that the EP 
will devote tremendous effort to preserve such a status for the EU Speakers Conference. The prospect 
that COSAC should instead perform this function – as implied in the Treaty of Lisbon, and preferred 
by some national parliaments – has been decisively rejected, largely as a result of the EP’s efforts. 
Objectively, it makes some sense to assign decision-making authority over interparliamentary 
cooperation collectively to the Speakers/Presidents, who are, in formal terms, the highest officials in 
their respective parliaments, as opposed to the chairs of the European Affairs committees, as 
represented in COSAC. But it is also advantageous for the EP to work through the forum of the EU 
Speakers Conference because it is a forum where all decisions are made by consensus, and therefore 
the EP may veto any unwanted decisions; furthermore, the EP’s position is enhanced by the fact that 
within the EP – which has no prime minister – the position of the President enjoys greater prestige 
than the Speaker of a typical national parliament within the EU. Maintaining the EU Speakers 
Conference in its pre-eminent position is consistent with the EP’s overall preference that direct 
parliamentary oversight of EU institutions should be exercised by the EP itself rather than by IPCs, 
and that the latter, if created, ought to be of marginal importance, with limited scope and no formal 
decision-making power.
44
 Whether one agrees that the emerging quasi-hierarchy among 
interparliamentary bodies is a positive development, there is no doubt that it makes interparliamentary 
cooperation more orderly.  
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IV. The Parliamentary Dimension of the Council Presidency 
The third trend in the emerging order of interparliamentary cooperation in the EU concerns the time 
and place of interparliamentary meetings. The Parliamentary Dimension of the Council Presidency 
(Parliamentary Dimension) contributes to this ‘order’ by providing an organizational framework for 
the overall sequence of parliamentary meetings. The aforesaid IPCs indeed do not take place in 
isolation but within the context of an increasingly elaborate biannual calendar of parliamentary events. 
These events constitute the ‘Parliamentary Dimension’ of the rotating six-month Council Presidency, 
as they are generally hosted and chaired by the parliament of the EU member state holding the Council 
Presidency – hence, the ‘Presidency Parliament’. This is a notable institutional development in 
interparliamentary cooperation that has received little academic attention.
45
  
These meetings are not ‘Council’ events because they are chaired by the parliament, not the 
government, of the member state holding the Council Presidency. The term ‘Parliamentary 
Dimension’ captures this ambiguity. It was coined in 2011 by the Polish Parliament, which wanted to 
differentiate its own series of events from those of the Polish Council Presidency, which took place in 
the second half of that year. Since then, whenever a new government has assumed the Council 
Presidency, its parliament has adopted the term Parliamentary Dimension to give a separate identity to 
its own parallel series of events. This effort has even extended to developing a separate ‘brand 
identity’: the Parliamentary Dimension will often have its own logo, of a design that is related to but 
different from that of the official logo of the Council Presidency, and its own website. 
The Parliamentary Dimension refers specifically to the series of 6-10 events under the Council 
Presidency that are (a) organized and chaired by the Presidency Parliament, sometimes in cooperation 
with the EP, (b) attended by members from the parliaments of all EU member states plus the EP, and 
(c) involve the discussion of EU policies. Most of these are chaired by the Presidency Parliament 
alone and held in the member state holding the Council presidency, often in the parliamentary 
chamber itself. However, some Parliamentary Dimension events are held in the EP in Brussels and co-
organized and co-chaired by the EP and the Presidency Parliaments: these include the first-semester 
SECG Conference and the occasional Joint Committee Meeting (JCM) or Joint Parliamentary Meeting 
(JPM). This definition excludes those meetings held in Brussels and solely chaired by the EP: for 
example, the EP typically hosts several Interparliamentary Committee Meetings (ICMs)
46
 in a given 
year that are attended by national parliamentarians, but these are not Parliamentary Dimension events 
as the Presidency Parliament is not involved in their organization. The above definition would also 
exclude any parliamentary diplomacy event involving large numbers of parliaments from non-EU 
countries, even if it were hosted by the Presidency Parliament.
47
 While Parliamentary Dimension 
events may also be attended by observers from parliaments outside the EU – e.g. candidate countries 
or special guests – they are primarily meetings of members of EU parliaments and their focus is on 
EU-related subjects.  
Since the creation of the two new IPCs in 2012 and 2013, four of the events in the six-month 
Parliamentary Dimension calendar now have a set format. In addition to the CFSP-CSDP and SECG 
Conferences, there are two COSAC meetings: the COSAC Chairs meet near the beginning of the six-
month semester, and the Plenary meets towards the end. Beyond these, a number of additional 
meetings – typically at least two, but sometimes more – are organized at the discretion of the 
Presidency Parliament, often reflecting its political priorities. Most such events are not large 
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conferences but meetings of the chairpersons of other sectoral committees of national parliaments and 
the EP, depending on the subject of the meeting. Examples of such meetings include those focusing on 
‘Human Trafficking in the Digital Age’ and ‘Energy’ (Netherlands, first semester 2016); 
‘Employment and Social Affairs’ and ‘Economic and Digital Affairs’ (Latvia, first semester 2015); 
and ‘Fundamental Rights’, ‘Agriculture, Industrial Development, and SMEs’, and ‘Employment, 
Research and Innovation’ (Italy, second semester 2014). Sometimes, the Presidency Parliament will 
co-chair a JCM at the EP in Brussels. Such was the case, for example, with the ‘Joint Meeting of the 
Committees on Justice and Home Affairs’ held under the Greek Parliamentary Dimension (first 
semester 2014). In addition, a Presidency Parliament will occasionally convene an ad hoc meeting on 
relatively short notice to discuss a current or salient subject. The Luxembourg Parliamentary 
Dimension (second semester 2015) did this when it held a ‘COSAC Working Group Meeting’ to 
discuss the enhanced political dialogue (the “green card”)48 and how to improve the early warning 
mechanism (the “yellow card”). 
Two additional yearly meetings are closely associated with, but not strictly part of, the 
Parliamentary Dimension. The EU Speakers Conference takes place annually in the Spring (normally 
April-May), but it is hosted and chaired by the parliament of the member state that held the Council 
Presidency the previous autumn. Moreover, the Speakers Conference is preceded by a preparatory 
meeting of the Secretaries-General of the EU Parliaments, typically in February-March. The latter 
meeting is the only major interparliamentary meeting involving parliamentary staff rather elected 
officials.
49
 
The introduction of the Parliamentary Dimension points to the fact that, while the takeover of 
European Council chairmanship by the President of the European Council has caused the importance 
of the rotating Council Presidency to decline, that of the Presidency Parliament has increased. 
Nowadays, some of the largest meetings that take place in the member state holding the Council 
Presidency are the major IPCs – typically, gatherings of hundreds of elected and non-elected officials. 
The Parliamentary Dimension gives the Presidency Parliament the power to set the agenda for both 
these IPCs and the smaller ad hoc meetings which it organizes, and thus an opportunity – albeit a 
modest one – to influence the debate concerning its own policy priorities. One should not exaggerate 
the potential influence of the Presidency Parliament. To take one example, the Lithuanian Parliament 
(second semester 2013) made a concerted effort to raise the profile of smaller Parliamentary 
Dimension events, even pushing for the meetings of chairpersons to formally adopt Conclusions in the 
same manner as the major IPCs.
50
 However, no subsequent Presidency Parliament has followed this 
example, so the smaller Parliamentary Dimension meetings have in general remained low-profile 
events. Even so, the Parliamentary Dimension framework is an important element of the emerging 
order of interparliamentary cooperation in the EU. 
V. Conclusion 
Interparliamentary cooperation in the EU has developed in dramatic and unexpected ways in recent 
years. Broad disagreement still persists – not only between the EP and national parliaments, but also 
among national parliaments themselves – over exactly what form interparliamentary cooperation 
should take. Nevertheless, while the field is still unsettled and contested, a new framework for 
interparliamentary cooperation has been evolving which in part builds upon, but also goes well 
beyond, that foreseen in the Treaty of Lisbon. 
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This chapter has highlighted three major trends in interparliamentary cooperation. First, two new 
major policy-specific interparliamentary conferences have been created – one in the field of foreign 
policy (the CFSP-CSDP Conference) and the other in the field of economic governance (the SECG 
Conference) – to complement the two long-standing conferences concerned with EU affairs in general 
(COSAC and the EU Speakers Conference). In addition, another policy-specific interparliamentary 
mechanism is foreseen in the field of JHA, although its exact form and scope have yet to be 
determined.  
Second, the EU Speakers Conference has in recent years taken on a quasi-constitutional role as the 
interparliamentary body with the authority not only to establish other forms of interparliamentary 
cooperation – including the policy-specific bodies mentioned above – but also to supervise their 
ongoing development. 
Third, the parliament of the member state holding the Council presidency now bears the 
considerable responsibility of hosting and chairing the most important interparliamentary meetings, 
under the auspices of the six-month “parliamentary dimension” of the Council presidency. These three 
features lend credence to the notion that there is an emerging order of interparliamentary cooperation 
in the post-Lisbon EU. 
The Treaty of Lisbon and the financial crisis were instrumental to these developments to varying 
degrees. First, they provided the impetus for the growth in policy-specific interparliamentary 
cooperation, in that both the CFSP-CSDP Conference and the future oversight body for Europol are 
outgrowths of the Treaty of Lisbon, and the SECG Conference was an outgrowth of the TSCG, which 
was in turn a direct response to the financial crisis. Second, when it became apparent that policy-
specific cooperation would take the form of new IPCs, this raised the question of how these should be 
created and supervised – tasks which eventually fell to the EU Speakers Conference. Third, the 
increase in interparliamentary activities raised the profile of the Presidency Parliament, whose 
enhanced organizational role was regularized in the institution of the “parliamentary dimension.” It 
would be inappropriate to exaggerate the importance of all this interparliamentary activity, as the 
newly-created IPCs do not have any independent decision-making authority; however, they do provide 
a discussion forum for MPs and MEPs to debate pressing public policy questions, and they perform an 
oversight function vis-à-vis the executive authorities of the EU. For these reasons, the emerging order 
of interparliamentary cooperation is a sign of national parliaments’ resilience, not resignation, as 
actors in the political system of the European Union.  
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